The Department of War released DOW-UAP-D14 in PURSUE Release 01 as a PDF mission report titled "Mission Report, Iraq, May 2022." The release metadata gives May 29, 2022 as the incident date, lists Syria as the incident location, and pairs the document with PR-21 motion imagery hosted through DVIDS.123
The PDF is a nine-page MISREP originally marked SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY. It was declassified by MG Richard A. Harrison, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, on October 8, 2025 and approved for release to AARO. The report identifies the originator as 50 ATKS, the domain as air, and the mission type as ISR; other fields cite Air Force, 603rd, 609 CAOC, and USEUCOM, while many personnel, aircraft, and coordinate details remain redacted.2
ISR Sortie Context
The document contains a mission narrative, administrative fields, operation and mission identifiers, points of contact, quality-control and approval fields, aircraft-equipment fields, a sortie timeline, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance tasking, a reaction section, a UAP section, an observation section, and weather entries. It is not a polished case study; it is an operational report in which the UAP entry appears among ordinary mission data and other observed military activity.2
The mission narrative places the aircraft on a long ISR sortie that departed Sigonella Air Base at 1355Z on May 29, collected SIGINT and IMINT, and worked tasking tied to the Eastern Mediterranean, Syrian Navy operating areas, the Israel-Lebanon-Syria region, Latakia, Tartus, and other named sites. The report also records Russian-linked ships and aircraft, including a probable SU-27/35 landing near 0011Z and a separate reaction by one to three aircraft, including a possible Russian Air Force SU-30, at about 2147Z.2
The reaction section says the possible SU-30 approached from the Syrian coast, passed underneath the reporting platform's orbit for roughly two minutes, and did not affect the mission. That episode is separate from the later UAP entry, but it explains why the report is dense with conventional air-defense and maritime observations around the same period.2
0117Z UAP Sighting
The UAP section records initial contact at 0117Z on May 30, 2022. It lists one UAP sighted, no recorded UAP signatures, a friendly platform altitude of FL240, and a friendly platform speed of 142 KIAS. The narrative field says the object flew north to northeast and was followed as long as possible; the screener could not positively identify it. The weather fields state weather was not a factor.2
The associated PR-21 video metadata says United States Central Command submitted the UAP report to AARO, describes ten seconds of infrared-sensor footage from a U.S. military platform, and ties that footage back to DOW-UAP-D14. The PR-21 description also says the accompanying mission report described the UAP as a "probable SU-27/35," with an AARO note that SU-27 and SU-35 are Russian military aircraft. Read against the PDF, that phrasing sits beside two related but distinct details: a conventional "probable SU-27/35" observation at 0011Z and a later UAP entry at 0117Z whose screener did not make a positive ID.34
Traceable Reporting Chain
DOW-UAP-D14 matters because it preserves a UAP report inside the operational paperwork of a classified ISR sortie rather than as a standalone anecdote. The record gives exact mission times, sensor-tasking context, partial locations, weather notes, conventional aircraft observations, and a linked video record, while also showing the limits created by redaction and uncertain identification.23
Its main evidentiary value is traceability. The case can be followed from release metadata, to the MISREP, to the PR-21 motion-imagery record, and each layer shows a different part of the same reporting chain: the platform's mission, the screener's inability to identify the object, and AARO's later contextual note about Russian aircraft types.123